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THE SUPERIOR SOLUTION TO THE “DENOMINATOR
PROBLEM”—COMPARING THE MAJORITY AND
DISSENT’S PROPERTY BENCHMARK TESTS IN MURR




On June 23, 2017, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5–3 decision—Murr
v. Wisconsin—set out a multifactor balancing test intended to resolve the “denomi-
nator problem” in regulatory takings cases involving real property. The denominator
problem asks how the pertinent parcel of land should be defined when deciding
whether a regulatory taking has occurred. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice
Roberts and joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, protested the unnecessary com-
plexity of the majority’s test. Fearing its potential ramifications on property rights,
the dissent set out an alternative, straightforward solution. While both the majority
and dissent’s tests would have arrived at the same holding—ruling against the Murr
family and in favor of St. Croix County—their solutions as to how the denominator
question should be answered are markedly different. This difference is especially
pronounced when comparing the tests’ potential to achieve denominators in agreement
with property owners’ reasonable expectations.
The Murr majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, offered three specific
considerations to weigh when defining the denominator: “[(1)] the treatment of the
land under state and local law; [(2)] the physical characteristics of the land; and [(3)]
the prospective value of the regulated land.”1 The Justices further elucidated:
The endeavor [(with respect to the denominator inquiry)] should
determine whether reasonable expectations about property own-
ership would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings
would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts.
The inquiry is objective, and the reasonable expectations at issue
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2019. MA, St. John’s University, 2015.
BA, Trinity College, 2009. I would like to thank Professor Lynda Butler for piquing my interest
in regulatory takings jurisprudence. I would also like to thank my parents, Scott and Ellen
McGuirk, for their continuous support and encouragement. Finally, I would like to thank the
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal staff for their help throughout the publication process.
1 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017).
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derive from background customs and the whole of [the federal]
legal tradition.2
The language of this additional explication closely resembles Justice Scalia’s pro-
posed solution to the denominator problem, as per his recommendation in footnote
seven of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council:
The answer to this difficult [denominator] question may lie in
how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by
the State’s law of property—i.e., whether and to what degree the
State’s law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claim-
ant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.3
In the final paragraph of the Murr opinion, Kennedy again writes: “Courts must
instead define the parcel [(the denominator)] in a manner that reflects reasonable
expectations about the property.”4 Despite such unambiguous statements, however,
it is difficult to imagine how a court balancing the three enumerated factors would
always yield a denominator in agreement with property owners’ reasonable expecta-
tions. Instead, a simpler, bright-line solution—one consistent with state law property
boundaries and immune from excessive discretion by courts—like that proposed by the
Murr dissent—and serving as the first of three factors enumerated by the majority—
would be better equipped to serve such a purpose.
Despite the majority’s obvious attempt to achieve fair outcomes through the use
of its multifactor balancing test, fairness may be better served through simplicity and
predictability. Accordingly, the dissent’s test—which defines the denominator by
looking exclusively to state law—offers a superior solution with respect to attaining
denominators in agreement with property owners’ reasonable expectations. In con-
sequence, the dissent’s solution affords future regulatory takings plaintiffs a less
malleable definition of their property, and with such increased predictability, property
owners can better anticipate the likelihood of their takings claims’ success.
The purpose of this Note is to compare the Murr majority’s and Murr dissent’s
different solutions to the denominator problem with a particular emphasis on their
capacities to achieve denominators in agreement with property owners’ reasonable
expectations.5 I will apply each test to past regulatory takings cases involving varied
2 Id.
3 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 n.7 (1992) (emphasis
added).
4 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950.
5 This said, I do not believe that property owners’ reasonable expectations should be a
factor in itself during the denominator inquiry. Rather, I agree with the dissent’s state law-based
determination and simply argue that the dissent’s solution does the better job in meeting such
reasonable property owner expectations.
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fact patterns. I will then compare their expected denominator outcomes and their
relation to reasonable property owners’ expectations.
Part I provides background information on the Takings Clause, regulatory takings
jurisprudence, the denominator problem, and the denominator problem’s historical
treatment by courts. Part II discusses Murr v. Wisconsin and the denominator tests
set forth by both the Court’s majority and dissent. Part III applies the Murr majority
and Murr dissent’s tests to three regulatory takings cases, with particular focus on
denominator outcomes and their relation to reasonable property owners’ expecta-
tions. These cases include: (1) Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,6 (2) Lost
Tree Village Corp. v. United States,7 and (3) Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.8 Finally, Part IV argues why the Murr dissent’s
test (as opposed to the Murr majority’s test) provides the superior solution to the
denominator problem.
I. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE, REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE, THE
DENOMINATOR PROBLEM, AND THE DENOMINATOR PROBLEM’S
HISTORICAL TREATMENT BY COURTS
A. The Takings Clause
Immediately following the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a pro-
vision known as the “Takings Clause” prescribes: “[N]or shall private property9 be
taken for public use,10 without just compensation.”11 The Takings Clause applies at
the state level by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 As explained by Justice
6 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
7 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d 787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied 137
S. Ct. 2325 (2017).
8 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
9 United States v. General Motors instructs that the term “property,” as used in the Takings
Clause, “denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing,
as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.” 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
10 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005) (footnotes and citations
omitted) (“‘[The Supreme] Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned
property be put into use for the general public.’ Indeed, while many state courts in the mid-19th
century endorsed ‘use by the public’ as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view
steadily eroded over time. Not only was the ‘use by the public’ test difficult to administer (e.g.,
what proportion of the public need have access to the property? at what price?), but it proved
to be impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of society. Accordingly, when this
Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it em-
braced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. V. “Just compensation” is defined as the fair market value of the
property at the time the land is thought to have been taken. See, e.g., Olson v. United States,
292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
12 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994) (citation omitted).
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Black in Armstrong v. United States,13 the Takings Clause was “designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”14 By the same token,
the Takings Clause is said to “serve[ ] [the] dual goals of protecting both private
property rights and the government’s need to regulate in the public interest.”15
B. Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
The Takings Clause was originally understood to apply to only physical seizures
of land.16 This limited interpretation, however, changed in 1922 with the watershed
Land Use decision Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,17 in which the Supreme Court ex-
tended the use of the Takings Clause to circumstances involving overly burdensome
regulations.18 In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Holmes instructed: “[W]hile
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.”19 Accordingly, “a new takings regime,”20 to wit, a “regulatory
takings”21 regime, emerged.
“The touchstone of the regulatory takings doctrine . . . is ‘to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to a direct appropriation of or ouster from
private property.’”22 In deciding whether a regulation has effected the functional
equivalent of a physical seizure, courts seek “to determine how the challenged regu-
lation affects the property’s value to the owner.”23 To date, two regulatory takings tests
have materialized concerning real property.24 The first test—the Lucas test25—considers
13 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
14 Id. at 49.
15 Miriam Seifter, Opinion Analysis: In Regulatory Takings Case, Court Announces a New
Test, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2017, 9:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion
-analysis-regulatory-takings-case-court-announces-new-test/ [https://perma.cc/T5GW-DGQX]
[hereinafter Seifter, Court Announces a New Test].
16 See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995).
17 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
18 See Treanor, supra note 16, at 782 (citation omitted) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision
in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon established a new takings regime.”).
19 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393 at 415.
20 Treanor, supra note 16, at 782.
21 Some courts refer to regulatory takings as “constructive takings.” JULIAN CONRAD
JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGU-
LATION LAW 391 (3d ed. 2013).
22 Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 529 (2005)).
23 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1944 (2017).
24 Regulatory takings can also be found in instances of personal property. See Horne v.
Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2422 (2015) (finding a regulatory taking where a program
under the Department of Agriculture—intended to prevent the oversaturation of the raisin
market—required the removal of some raisins from the open market).
25 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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categorical (per se) takings in instances “where a regulation deprives real property
of all economically viable use26 . . . unless the state can prove that the regulation does
no more to restrict use than what the state courts could do under background principles
of property law or the law of private or public nuisance.”27 When a regulation does
not deprive the landowner of all economically viable use, courts apply the second
test—the Penn Central test—to decide whether a taking has occurred.28 The Penn
Central test sets out three factors to be considered: (1) the economic impact of the regu-
lation on the landowner, (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct
investment-backed expectations,29 and (3) the character of the government action.30
C. The Denominator Problem
The takings analysis is thought to be better understood with the support of
fractions.31 In such instances, the numerator (top number) is to be substituted with
a number constituting the value of the regulated portion (i.e., the portion of the total
parcel that is being impacted by the government regulation).32 The question as to
“the unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction,’”33
is the very question contemplated by the denominator problem. To be clear, the
denominator problem asks how to define “the ‘property interest’ against which the
loss of value is to be measured,”34 and more specifically, “the entirety of the owner’s
rights in the ‘parcel as a whole.’”35
26 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Managing Space to Manage Growth, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL. REV. 801, 822 (1999) (“In Lucas, the Court did not decide whether there must be a
developmental use of the property to avoid a claim that a regulation does not allow an economic-
ally viable use. Some cases have held the key question is whether there is a competitive and
realistic market for the land that is subject to restriction. This means there must be a market
of buyers who are willing to buy the land for development, not for speculation. It does not
mean the land use regulation allows a developmental use of the property.”).
27 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 21, at 404 (emphasis added).
28 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (“Where a regulation places
limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use [(i.e., fail to
satisfy a takings under Lucas)], a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on [the]
complex of factors [enumerated in Penn Central] . . . .”).
29 Courts now consider “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” which can be con-
strued as a more objective standard. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034.
30 See infra accompanying notes 44–52.
31 See Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of
Lucas: Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1848–49 (2017).
32 See id. at 1849.
33 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1944 (2017) (citations omitted). 
34 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
35 Brown & Merriam, supra note 31, at 1849.
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The denominator problem surfaces in all regulatory takings cases involving real
property.36 Before deciding whether a regulatory taking has occurred under the
categorical Lucas rule or the ad hoc, multifactor Penn Central test, the court must
first define the parcel against which loss of value is to be measured.37
Professor Lynn Blais offers a simple hypothetical illustrating the importance of
the denominator determination: “[A] regulation prohibiting development on one acre
of wetlands in the corner of a five-acre lot can be viewed as depriving the landowner
of 100 percent of that acre of land or 20 percent of the entire lot.”38 Based on this
example, an obvious taking would be found if the denominator contemplated only
that portion of the parcel directly impacted by the government regulation (i.e., the
one affected acre).39 On the other hand, no taking would likely be found if the
denominator instead reflected the property owner’s entire holding (i.e., the total five-
acre lot).
The denominator determination is generally thought to be outcome-determinative,40
particularly in the case of Lucas claims. As discussed in Section I.B,41 the Lucas
inquiry merely contemplates the property’s diminution in economic value. More
specifically, Lucas asks whether the pertinent regulation has divested the landowner
of all “productive or economically beneficial use of [his] land.”42 “[W]hether the
owner has been deprived of all economic value of his property will depend on how
‘property’ is defined. The ‘composition of the denominator in our “deprivation”
fraction’ is the dispositive inquiry.”43 On that basis, the smaller the denominator, and
the more aligned the denominator is with the numerator—the portion of the parcel
thought to impacted by the regulation—the stronger the claim for a total takings
36 See id. (“[P]roperty owners seek to characterize their property rights narrowly . . .
government regulators seek to characterize [them] . . . broadly . . . .”). 
37 “The denominator question . . . is just a preliminary step; courts must then decide
whether a taking occurred, applying . . . the tests from Penn Central . . . or Lucas . . . .”
Seifter, Court Announces a New Test, supra note 15.
38 Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 50–51 (2017) (em-
phasis added).
39 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
Justice Stevens speaks to this exact point: “defining the property interest taken in terms of
the very regulation being challenged is circular. With property so divided, every [regulation]
would become a total [taking] . . . .” 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002).
40 See Miriam Seifter, Argument Preview: Defining the Denominator in Regulatory
Takings Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 14, 2017, 5:11 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03
/argument-preview-defining-denominator-regulatory-takings-law/ [https://perma.cc/2V8Q
-PMWD] [hereinafter Seifter, Defining the Denominator] (“The answers [to the denominator
question] matter: A regulation’s burden might look severe when measured against one segment
of a property, but slight when compared to a larger property interest.”).
41 See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
42 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
43 Blais, supra note 38, at 62–63.
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under Lucas. For example, if the numerator was two acres of agricultural property,
a denominator determination of two, three, or four acres would be conclusive under
the Lucas analysis. In this instance, only a denominator of two acres could constitute
a total deprivation of beneficial use.
When the Court fails to find a categorical Lucas taking,44 the ad hoc, multifactor
Penn Central test is applied.45 Here, the denominator determination also plays a
significant role. The first Penn Central factor—the economic impact of the regula-
tion on the landowner—again considers the property’s diminution of value.46 Once
more, the denominator determination is integral to such an inquiry. The second Penn
Central factor, which balances the extent to which the regulation interferes with
property owners’ investment-backed expectations, is similarly influenced by the
denominator determination.47 Needless to say, any denominator finding at odds with
a property owner’s personal definition has the potential to ignore such investment-
backed expectations. Finally, the denominator determination is also relevant under
the third Penn Central factor, which scrutinizes the character of the government
action.48 Although the Penn Central Court seemingly intended that this factor
contemplate “whether the government physically invaded the claimant’s tangible
property or authorized a third person to do so,”49 this factor has since taken on a
different, yet muddled meaning. “The ‘character or extent of the government action’
factor has been read by many courts to open up the inquiry into an assessment of the
‘purpose and importance of the public interest,’ which then must be weighed against
the loss.”50 For example, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis,51
when contemplating this third prong “the Court . . . ask[ed] whether the govern-
ment’s actions were justified.”52 Though this factor remains subject to interpretation,
the size of the denominator is of particular importance when deciding whether the
44 See Brown & Merriam, supra note 31, at 1849–50. As of July 2017, after reviewing
“more than 1,700 cases in state and federal courts,” the article’s authors discovered “only 27
cases in 25 years in which courts found a categorical taking under Lucas. By percentage, that
works out to a Lucas-claim success rate of just 1.6%.” Id.
45 See Blais, supra note 38, at 50.
46 See Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part
I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1325 (1989) (“The
Court . . . inquired whether the challenged law greatly diminishes the value of the claimaint’s
tangible thing . . . .”).
47 See id. at 1320.
48 See id. at 1317–18.
49 Id. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (hold-
ing four years after Penn Central that “[w]hen the ‘character of the governmental action,’ . . . is
a permanent physical occupation of real property, [a per se taking is established] . . . without
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal eco-
nomic impact on the owner”).
50 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 21, at 408.
51 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
52 Peterson, supra note 46, at 1319.
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government’s actions are justified. If a government action were to impact only 8
acres of a 100-acre parcel—notwithstanding the government objective—a court
would have an easier time finding the action justifiable than it would if the regula-
tion were to impact 80 of the 100 acres.
Because the denominator question often bears on the ultimate takings outcome,
the relevant parcel’s definition is frequently subject to manipulation.
[P]roperty owners seek to characterize their property rights nar-
rowly for as small a denominator as possible. The smaller the
denominator, the more likely it is to be equal to the numerator.
On the other hand, government regulators seek to characterize
the property owner’s property rights broadly for as large a de-
nominator as possible.53
As described above, the denominator is often subject to manipulation by both
private parties as well as the government.54
D. The Denominator Problem’s Historical Treatment by Courts
Before Murr, “the [Supreme] Court ha[d] not set forth specific guidance on how
to identify the [denominator] . . . .”55 Nonetheless, the Murr Court highlighted two
limiting principles that had, up to that point, emerged from Supreme Court regula-
tory takings precedent. “First, the Court has declined to limit the parcel in an
artificial manner to the portion of property targeted by the challenged regulation.”56
Referring back to Professor Blais’s hypothetical, in which one acre of wetlands in
a five-acre lot is prohibited from development, the Court has rejected the approach
yielding a denominator of one, as such an approach—which limits the denominator
to only that property interest being regulated—would always result in a taking:
‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into dis-
crete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. . . . [Instead,
taking jurisprudence] focuses . . . on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.57
53 Brown & Merriam, supra note 31, at 1849.
54 See id. at 1850.
55 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1944 (2017).
56 Id.
57 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (emphasis added).
John Fee provides the following example of this “nonseverability rule” in practice: “A home-
owner, therefore, who is prohibited from running a magazine stand on her front lawn does not
have a valid taking claim simply because her right to run a magazine stand was completely
extinguished through regulation.” John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory
Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (1994).
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The second limiting principle provided by the Murr Court was “the view that property
rights under the Takings Clause should be coextensive with those under state law.”58
Citing the holding in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,59 the Court proceeded to qualify
that despite the import of state law when defining the denominator, “[s]tates do not
have the unfettered authority to ‘shape and define property rights and reasonable
investment-backed expectations,’ leaving landowners without recourse against
unreasonable regulations.”60 In different words, a landowner cannot be barred from a
takings claim just because the pertinent regulation was in existence at the time she
gained title to the property.
A given parcel may encompass a multitude of property interests, including “‘the
rights to possess, use, and dispose of’ [ ] property.”61 Accordingly, the denominator
itself may embrace much more than the horizontal surface of land.62 Dwight Merriam
describes “[t]he world of the relevant parcel” as a “wonderland, where size seems
to change in confusing ways.”63 Indeed, the denominator—which “can be measured
physically, functionally and temporally,”64—has received flexible treatment by courts,
oftentimes permitting considerations beyond that which many property owners would
reasonably anticipate. Some of these considerations include: subsurface rights, air
rights, “functional dimensions” (property characteristics including “density, use, bulk,
and dimensional standards”);65 transfer of development rights (commonly called
TDRs);66 treatment of the parcel as a temporal estate (encompassing “property in-
terests over time, such [as] a property [with] no current use but [with] speculative
value”);67 economic burdens (e.g., “the requirement to clean up pollution, may diminish
the [denominator’s] ‘size’”);68 positive externalities (when the regulation simultaneously
58 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944.
59 533 U.S. 606, 626–27 (2001) (holding that plaintiff property owner was not barred
from a takings claim just because the property was already subject to the pertinent regulation
when plaintiff acquired it).
60 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944–45 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626).
61 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)).
62 Josh Patashnik, Less Than Meets The Eye: Murr’s Impact is Likely Limited, Law360
(July 3, 2017, 10:29 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/940066/less-than-meets-the-eye
-murr-s-impact-is-likely-limited [https://perma.cc/74EY-R8FB] (“[B]ecause any given person
or company may possess a multitude of different property interests, identifying the relevant
parcel . . . the ‘denominator’ of the takings inquiry—is sometimes a complicated endeavor.”).
63 Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 415 (2003).
64 Id. at 414.
65 1 PATRICK J. ROHAN & ERIC D. KELLY, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 53C.09
(2017).
66 A transfer of development rights, or TDR, “is the yielding of some or all of the right
to develop or use a parcel of land in exchange for a right to develop or use another parcel of
land, or another portion of the same parcel of land, more intensively.” Id.
67 Merriam, supra note 63, at 363.
68 Id. at 361.
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enhances the regulated property’s market value because of how it restricts other
neighboring properties);69 the inclusion of contiguous and noncontiguous holdings
when “used as part of a consolidated operation;”70 and the inclusion of later-acquired
properties (“parcels purchased at different times, before or after regulation”).71
II. MURR V. WISCONSIN AND ITS MAJORITY AND DISSENT’S DENOMINATOR TESTS
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Murr in the hope of
bringing clarity to the denominator issue.72 On a narrower scale, Murr also provided
the Court the opportunity to clarify whether commonly owned contiguous, but
legally distinct, parcels could be combined for the purpose of defining the denomi-
nator.73 Put differently, Murr would elucidate whether state and local governments
could treat two adjacent parcels owned by a common owner as one single parcel, or
whether each parcel ought to be treated as distinct property interests.
Before oral argument in the Murr case, Miriam Seifter outlined some of the
questions requiring clarity when tackling the denominator issue:
[I]s the parcel the single lot whose use is most affected by the
challenged regulation, the owner’s contiguous holdings, or some
broader set of the owner’s affected interests? Is the parcel de-
fined by state lot lines, by other state land use regulations, or by
other criteria?74
The Murr majority’s test seemingly answers all of these questions, albeit with mini-
mal clarity.
A. Facts
In 1972, under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,75 Wisconsin and Minnesota
were commanded “to develop ‘a management and development program’ for the [St.
Croix River] area,” as the River had been chosen for federal protection.76 In compliance
with the Act, and for the purpose of protecting “the wild, scenic, and recreational
69 See id.
70 Id. at 358.
71 Id. at 359.
72 Patashnik, supra note 62.
73 Gavin S. Frisch, What is the Relevant Parcel? Clarifying the “Parcel as a Whole” Stan-
dard in Murr v. Wisconsin, 12 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PP SIDEBAR 253, 254 (2017).
74 Seifter, Defining the Denominator, supra note 40.
75 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(6) (2006).
76 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2017).
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qualities of the river,” Wisconsin’s State Department of Natural Resources promul-
gated restrictions on development.77
The plaintiffs in Murr were four siblings who inherited two adjacent lots along-
side the St. Croix River in Troy, Wisconsin.78 The lots were purchased separately
by plaintiffs’ parents—Lot F in 1960, and Lot E in 1963.79 Plaintiffs’ parents “built
a small recreational cabin” on Lot F, but left Lot E undeveloped.80 Although plain-
tiff’s parents continuously held title to Lot E from 1983 to 1995, in 1961, before the
purchase of Lot E, plaintiffs’ parents transferred Lot F’s title to their family’s plumb-
ing company.81 For this reason, Lots E and F remained under separate ownership
until they were conveyed to plaintiffs in 1994 and 1995.82
Lots E and F are described as having “the same topography:”83
A steep bluff cuts through the middle of each, with level land suit-
able for development above the bluff and next to the water below
it . . . . Though each lot is approximately 1.25 acres in size, because
of the waterline and the steep bank they each have less than one
acre of land suitable for development. Even when combined, the
lots’ buildable land area is only 0.98 acres due to the steep terrain.84
Under the rules promulgated by the State Department of Natural Resources,
property where plaintiffs’ lots were located could not be developed if less than one
acre of the property was suitable for development.85 Despite the existence of a
grandfather clause authorizing development on “substandard lots which were ‘in
separate ownership from abutting lands’ on January 1, 1976,”86 a merger provision
also existed, stipulating that “adjacent lots under common ownership may not be
‘sold or developed as separate lots’ if they do not meet the size requirement [that each
tract contain one acre of land suitable for development].”87 This merger provision
77 Id. (quoting WIS. STAT. § 30.27(I) (1973)).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1939–40.
81 Id. at 1940.
82 Id. at 1940–41.
83 Id. at 1940.
84 Id.
85 Id. (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ NR 118.04(4), 118.03(27), 118.06(1)(a)(2)(a),
118.06(1)(b) (2017)).
86 Id. (quoting WIS. ADMIN. CODE § NR 118.08(4)(a)(1) (2017)) (January 1, 1976 was
the date on which the regulation took effect).
87 Id. (quoting WIS. ADMIN. CODE § NR 118.08(4)(a)(2) (2017)). As per the rules promul-
gated by the Wisconsin State Department of Natural Resources, St. Croix County’s zoning
ordinance also included identical provisions. Id. (citing St. Croix County, Wis., Ordinance
§ 17.361.4.a (2005)).
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was accordingly triggered when Lots E and F came under common ownership in the
mid-1990s, thus “barring their separate sale or development.”88 Presumably, plain-
tiffs were not aware of this merger until they became interested in selling Lot E in
the mid-2000s.89 Plaintiffs thereafter sought a variance permitting the “separate sale
or use of the lots,” but the St. Croix County Board of Adjustments denied this
request.90 As a result, Plaintiffs asserted a regulatory takings claim, which eventually
found its way to the United States Supreme Court.91
B. Majority vs. Dissent Tests
The majority’s denominator test enumerates three Penn Central–like factors.
They include: “[1] the treatment of the [property] under state and local law; [2] the
physical characteristics of the [property]; and [3] the prospective value of the regu-
lated [property]”.92 The first factor—treatment of the property under state and local
law—is the sole consideration deemed appropriate under the dissent’s test.93 According
to the majority, the additional two considerations—factors two and three—“accord
with other indicia of reasonable expectations about property.”94 As discussed infra,95
I strongly disagree with the majority on this point; it is my contention that any
considerations beyond the property’s definition under state law are inherently in
conflict with reasonable property owner expectations.
1. Murr Majority’s Test
a. Factor One
Factor one of the majority’s test is “treatment of the land under state and local
law.”96 The majority writes: “[t]he reasonable expectations of an acquirer of land
must acknowledge legitimate restrictions affecting his or her subsequent use and
dispensation of the property.”97 Citing Palazzolo, however, the majority qualifies
that “[a] valid takings claim will not evaporate just because a purchaser took title
after the law was enacted.”98
88 Id. at 1941.
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 1941–42.
92 Id. at 1945.
93 Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 1946–47.
95 See discussion infra Part IV.
96 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
97 Id. (citing Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 262 (1907)).
98 Id. See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“[E]nactments [that]
are unreasonable [ ] do not become less [unreasonable] through passage of time or title. Were
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b. Factor Two
Factor two of the majority’s test contemplates the “physical characteristics of
the land.”99 The majority states: “These [physical characteristics] include the physical
relationship of any distinguishable tracts, the parcel’s topography, and the surround-
ing human and ecological environment.”100 The majority adds that “it may be relevant
if the property is located in an area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to,
environmental or other regulation.”101 Ultimately, this factor, like the other two
factors, is supposed to be examined in such a way that defers to reasonable property
owners’ expectations.102 That said, why else would courts weigh the property’s
potential for being subject to regulations?
c. Factor Three
Factor three of the majority’s test ponders the “prospective value of the regu-
lated land.”103 In the majority’s view, courts should “[pay] special attention to the
effect of [the] burdened land on the value of other holdings.”104 In asking courts to
consider whether “the [regulation’s] effect [is] tempered [because] the regulated
land adds value to the remaining property,”105 this third factor appears consistent
with “reciprocity of advantage”106 ideas. Moreover, the Court added that “[t]he
absence of a special relationship between the holdings may counsel against consid-
eration of all the holdings as a single parcel . . . .”107
we to accept [that a purchaser or successive title holder be barred from a takings claim by
virtue of their having constructive notice of the restriction] . . . no matter how extreme or
unreasonable [the restriction][,] [a] State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date
on the Takings Clause.”).
99 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1945–46 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903
(1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring)).
102 See id. at 1946–47 (referring to factors two and three as “other indicia of reasonable
expectations about property”).
103 Id. at 1945.
104 Id. at 1946.
105 Id.
106 See Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic
Trend in Regulatory Takings, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2003/2004) (“Put simply,
reciprocity of advantage assumes that the benefits and burdens of any particular economic
regulation are distributed unequally. But because each property owner benefits from certain
regulations that are imposed on others, the overall scheme of regulation provides a net benefit
for individual property owners. Accordingly, awarding compensation to an individual property
owner on the basis of the detriment from an individual regulation would confer a windfall
on the property owner.”).
107 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946.
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2. Application of Majority’s Test to Murr Facts
a. Factor One
The majority concluded that under factor one—treatment of the land under state
and local law—the Murrs’ two parcels, Lots E and F, should be combined and
“treated as one.”108 The majority arrived at this conclusion due to the pertinent
merger provision which took effect at the time both properties came under common
ownership (i.e., after both lots were conveyed to plaintiffs in 1994 and 1995).109 The
Court noted: “Petitioners’ insistence that lot lines define the relevant parcel ignores
the well-settled reliance on the merger provision as a common means of balancing
the legitimate goals of regulation with the reasonable expectation of landowners.”110
Even if the plaintiffs had no actual notice of the provision, they should have known
of its existence, and thus had constructive notice of the regulation.111
b. Factor Two
The majority concluded that under factor two—physical characteristics of the
land—the property’s physical characteristics “support[ed] its treatment as a unified
parcel.”112 The Court noted that the lots were contiguous and found that “[t]heir
rough terrain and narrow shape make it reasonable to expect their range of potential
uses might be limited.”113 Moreover, the Court found that the plaintiffs “could have
anticipated public regulation might affect their enjoyment of their property” given
the properties’ location along the Lower St. Croix River, an area “regulated . . .
under federal, state, and local law long before petitioners possessed the land.”114
c. Factor Three
The majority concluded that under factor three—prospective value of the regu-
lated land—“the prospective value that Lot E brings to Lot F supports considering the
two as one parcel . . . .”115 Even though government regulation prevented the Murrs
108 Id. at 1948.
109 See id. at 1940–41.
110 Id. at 1947. See also Brief for National Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae
at 32, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214) (“These merger provisions are
so common, and have been in place for so long, that they are within the reasonable expec-
tations of landowners and their lawyers.”).
111 The Court noted, however, that “the harshness of a merger provision may be ameliorated
by the availability of a variance from the local zoning authority . . . .” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1947.
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from selling and developing the parcels separately, the Court found that “this re-
striction is mitigated by the benefits of using the property as an integrated whole,
allowing increased privacy and recreational space,116 plus the optimal location of any
improvements.”117 To bolster this conclusion, the Court emphasized that the com-
bined value of Lot E and Lot F (when treated as one parcel) greatly exceeded the
estimated value of the lots when treated separately.118 In sum, the Court argued that
the lots were of greater market value when treated as one parcel.
d. Majority’s Denominator Outcome
Upon weighing each of the three factors, the majority concluded that the de-
nominator should encompass both Lots E and F.119 Like most courts conducting a
takings analysis, the Court did not provide numerical information explaining its
treatment of the numerator and denominator. Without such figures, it is unclear
whether the denominator simply aligned with each lot’s dimensions, as dictated
under state and local law, or if the denominator was modified any further to account
for some of the other considerations weighed by the court.
3. Murr Dissent’s Test
The dissent’s denominator test proposes that the denominator only be governed by
state law boundaries (i.e., the lot’s dimensions in combination with existing regula-
tions).120 Chief Justice Roberts writes: “State laws define the boundaries of distinct units
of land, and those boundaries should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, de-
termine the parcel at issue.”121 Chief Justice Roberts explains that because “State law
defines all of the interests that come along with owning a particular parcel,” “[f]oll-
owing state property lines is . . . entirely consistent with Penn Central” as “[t]h[e]
risk of strategic unbundling122 is not present when a legally distinct parcel is the
basis of the regulatory takings claim.”123
116 See id. at 1948–49 (“They have an elevated level of privacy because they do not have
close neighbors . . . .”).
117 Id. at 1948.
118 Id. at 1949 (appraising the combined lots at $698,300 and the total of the lots when
sold separately at $413,000).
119 Id. (“The State Court of Appeals was correct in analyzing petitioners’ property as a
single unit.”).
120 Id. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
121 Id.
122 See id. (implying that “strategic unbundling” is when property owners attempt to define
the relevant parcel in a very limited way; in other words, they “strategically pluck one strand
from their bundle of property rights—such as [ ] air rights . . . and claim a complete taking
based on that strand alone”).
123 Id.
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Chief Justice Roberts rightly objects to the majority’s solution, contending that
“[i]n departing from state property principles, the majority . . . create[s] a litigation-
specific definition of ‘property’ . . . .”124 “In the dissent’s view, the majority wrongly
conflated the ultimate ‘question of what constitutes a taking’—where the court has
repeatedly stressed the need for a flexible, open-ended inquiry—with the antecedent
question of how to identify the property interest at stake in the first place . . . .”125:
In deciding that Lots E and F are a single parcel, the majority
focuses on the importance of the ordinance at issue and the
extent to which the Murrs may have been especially surprised,
or unduly harmed, by the application of that ordinance to their
property. But these issues should be considered when deciding
if a regulation constitutes a ‘taking.’ Cramming them into the
definition of ‘private property’ undermines the effectiveness of
the Takings Clause as a check on the government’s power to
shift the cost of public life onto private individuals.126
Here, Roberts argues that the integration of Penn Central–like factors into the
denominator inquiry undercuts one of the very reasons the Takings Clause ex-
ists—to protect against the unfair allocation of public burdens on only some land-
owners.127 Roberts rightly suggests that a malleable property definition is in conflict
with the very protection the Takings Clause is supposed to afford.128
Roberts proceeds to protest: “The result [of the majority’s approach to the
denominator] is that the government’s regulatory interests will come into play not
once, but twice—first when identifying the relevant parcel, and again when deter-
mining whether the regulation has placed too great a public burden on that prop-
erty.”129 Accordingly, “through ‘clear double counting,’” the majority’s test “stacks
the deck in the government’s favor . . . .”130
124 Id. at 1954–55.
125 Patashnik, supra note 62 (citing Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
126 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
127 Id.
128 For further discussion on the Chief Justice’s proposition, see infra Section IV.A.
129 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See also Maureen E. Brady, Essay,
Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin Mean for Property Fed-
eralism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 58 (2017) (“[T]he announced test gives regulators
two bites at the apple . . . existing regulations are taken into account both in constructing the
relevant property and in examining whether a taking has occurred, allowing the same
regulations to limit the constitutional claim at two stages.”).
130 Seifter, Court Announces a New Test, supra note 15.
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4. Probable Application of Dissent’s Test to Murr Facts
As indicated by the dissent’s agreement with the case’s overall outcome,131 the
dissent would have considered the pertinent state merger provision in its denomina-
tor analysis. Such consideration would therefore treat the two commonly owned but
legally distinct contiguous parcels as one tract.132
Although an argument could be made that such treatment, despite being in ac-
cord with relevant state law, is at odds with the property owners’ (the Murrs’) reason-
able expectations—given their use of one of the parcels for recreational purposes and
the other parcel’s treatment as more of an investment holding—a counter-argument
could be made that reasonable property owners stay abreast of regulations affecting
their holdings, and that the plaintiffs should have known the merger provision would
take effect once the parcels came under common ownership.133
III. APPLICATION OF THE MURR MAJORITY AND DISSENT’S TESTS TO
REGULATORY TAKINGS CASES, WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON
DENOMINATOR OUTCOMES AND THEIR RELATION TO
REASONABLE PROPERTY OWNERS’ EXPECTATIONS
A. Case 1: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council134 is one of the foremost cases in regula-
tory takings jurisprudence.135 As previously mentioned, Lucas established a per se
takings in cases where a government regulation is found to deprive property owners
of “all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”136 The facts of Lucas are as
follows: In 1986, plaintiff paid $975,000 for two beachfront residential properties in
Charleston County, South Carolina.137 The lots “were located approximately 300 feet
from the beach” on a barrier island.138 Plaintiff intended to construct single-family
131 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that the reg-
ulation does not effect a taking that requires just compensation. This bottom-line conclusion
does not trouble me; the majority presents a fair case that the Murrs can still make good use of
both lots, and that the ordinance is a commonplace tool to preserve scenic areas, such as the
Lower St. Croix River, for the benefit of landowners and the public alike.”).
132 See id. at 1948 (“[S]tate and local regulations merged Lots E and F.”).
133 See id. at 1940–41.
134 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
135 Id. at 1008. See Brown & Merriam, supra note 31, at 1849 (“Today, Lucas remains the
controlling law on categorical regulatory takings.”).
136 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
137 Id. at 1006–07.
138 Id. at 1008. See Barrier Island, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/barrierisland [https://perma.cc/ZJ56-48W4] (“A long broad sandy island
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homes on each property, just as “the owners of the immediately adjacent parcels had
already done.”139 However, in 1988, only two years after purchasing the properties,
the South Carolina Legislature passed the Beachfront Management Act,140 “which
had the direct effect of barring [plaintiff] from erecting any permanent habitable
structures on his two parcels.”141 Plaintiff thereafter filed suit, claiming that the
legislation’s barring of development on his land constituted a taking of his property
without just compensation.142
1. Analysis Under the Murr Majority’s Test
Analysis under factor one—treatment of the property under state and local
law—would likely yield no surprises. The Beachfront Management Act, which
restricted development on each of the properties, was not enacted until two years
after plaintiff purchased the lots.143 Although two commonly owned parcels were at
issue—like that seen in Murr—there was no state law merger provision at play, and
lots 22 and 24 were non-contiguous.144 Though the Murr majority seems to leave the
door open for two commonly owned non-contiguous parcels to be combined for the
purpose of the denominator, absent an explicit state law merger provision, such a
joining of lots would not occur under factor one, but could apply under factors two
or three. Therefore, with regard to the first Murr factor, most courts would likely
treat lots 22 and 24 as distinct fee simple interests.145
Analysis under factor two—physical characteristics of the land—could favor a
larger denominator outcome. With respect to this second factor, Justice Kennedy
wrote: “it may be relevant that the property is located in an area that is subject to,
or likely to become subject to, environmental or other regulation.”146 In fact, Justice
Kennedy specifically cited his concurrence in Lucas to support this proposition.147
For this reason, a court may argue that given the tracts’ discernibly vulnerable
location on a barrier island, subsequent development restrictions could or should
have been anticipated. On the other hand, although the likelihood for severe coastal
lying parallel to a shore that is built up by the action of waves, currents, and winds and that pro-
tects the shore from [erosive] effects of the ocean.”) (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
139 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007–08.
140 S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (1990).
141 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
142 Id. at 1009.
143 Id. at 1008–09.
144 Id. at 1007–09.
145 In footnote seven of Lucas, Justice Scalia describes the fee simple interest as “an estate
with a rich tradition of protection at common law.” Id. at 1017 n.7.
146 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945–46 (2017).
147 See id. at 1946 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035) (“Coastal property may present such
unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in regulating its develop-
ment and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit.”).
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erosion may appear obvious in 2018, it may have been less obvious when the case
was decided in 1992.148 Conversely, the South Carolina legislature enacted the regu-
lation only two years after plaintiff’s purchase;149 this fact suggests that the prospect
for regulation was probably not a complete surprise. However, even if a court thought
that the plaintiff should have anticipated such a regulation, it does not appear to have
been factored into the purchase price, as $975,000 for two vacant beachfront lots was
no bargain in 1992.150 A court whose primary objective during the denominator inquiry
is to weigh property owners’ reasonable expectations may have difficulty overlooking
this point.151 Another factor worthy of consideration is that subsequent to litigation,
in 1994, the Lucas lots remained “the only vacant lots in sight along the beach.”152
Such development on all neighboring properties further supports the argument that
reasonable property owners would not have anticipated such an onerous restriction.
Analysis under factor three—prospective value of the regulated land—is unlikely
to change the denominator outcome. First, Murr advises that “[t]he absence of a
special relationship between the holdings may counsel against consideration of all
the holdings as a single parcel.”153 In Lucas, Lots 22 and 24 were non-contiguous
and bore no such “special relationship”;154 this consideration therefore leans toward
treatment of the lots as distinct parcels. Murr further recommends that, under this
factor, courts “[pay] special attention to the effect of burdened land on the value of
other holdings.”155 Under the facts of Lucas, each parcel is enduring a distinct
burden. Although one may try to argue that the prohibition of development on one
of the parcels enhances the value of the other parcel (by virtue of there being more
open, natural space in close proximity), such an argument holds little water, as all
other properties alongside the beach were developed; such a value increase would
be minimal at best.
2. Analysis Under the Murr Dissent’s Test
Analysis under the dissent’s test would merely replicate the denominator
produced under factor one of the majority’s test. Thus, each lot would be treated as
148 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1021–22 n.10.
149 Id. at 1008.
150 Id. at 1006–07; see also CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpi
calc.pl?cost1=975%2C000.00&year1=199201&year2=201809 [https://perma.cc/TYZ3-6K5Q]
(last visited Nov. 29, 2018) (showing the equivalent price today as over $1.7 million).
151 But see JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 21, at 411 (“Courts have generally
refrained from allowing the purchase price of land to qualify as an investment-backed ex-
pectation.”).
152 William A. Fischel, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Photographic Essay (Feb.
1995), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wfischel/lucasessay.html [https://perma.cc/B85H-3GWQ].
153 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1946 (2017).
154 Id.
155 Id.
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distinct fee simple interests, yielding separate denominators in agreement with those
boundaries prescribed under state and local law.
3. How the Murr Majority’s Expected Denominator Outcome Aligns with
Property Owners’ Reasonable Expectations
All things considered, most courts would likely yield the same denominator in
Lucas when applying the Murr majority factors. State and local law—factor one—
instructs that the non-contiguous lots, absent a merger provision, be treated as
separate property interests.156 With respect to the prospective value of the regulated
land—factor three—a court is unlikely to find a special relationship between the
parcels, as neither lot ostensibly enhances the value of the other.157
Factor two—physical characteristics of the land—however, has the potential to
skew the denominator outcome when applied by some courts. As discussed supra,158
the argument can be made that plaintiff could have anticipated that his properties
would be “subject to [future] environmental . . . regulation.”159 Although the expen-
sive purchase prices and the fact that all neighboring parcels had been previously
developed cuts against the argument that environmental restrictions were foresee-
able, a court less in tune with property owners’ reasonable expectations might allow
this foreseeability of regulation argument to alter their perception of the denomina-
tor. The importance of this fact and factor will inevitably vary by court, as the Murr
majority offers no guidance as to how each factor should be weighed.160 Moreover,
even if Murr provided specific instruction as to how each factor should be calcu-
lated, the fact that this foreseeability argument (that plaintiff could have anticipated
that the property would be subject to future environmental regulations) will be raised
again during the second stage of the takings analysis, during the subsequent Penn
Central balancing test, is plainly unfair and at odds with reasonable property owners’
expectations. In different words, under the Murr factors, a court can consider—or
“count”—this foreseeability argument at both the first and second stages of the takings
analysis161 (whereas previously, it could only be considered at the second stage).162
To repeat Seifter’s argument, this inevitable “double counting” of information
“stacks the deck in the government’s favor,”163 as it can be used to weaken plain-
tiff’s case at two stages of the takings analysis, as opposed to one. In consequence,
156 Id. at 1940, 1945.
157 Id. at 1946.
158 See supra Section III.A.1 (describing the analysis under factor two of the Murr majority
test).
159 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946.
160 See id. at 1945.
161 See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
163 See Seifter, Court Announces a New Test, supra note 15.
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it is possible that the Lucas denominator outcome could change under the Murr
majority, and in such a case, the denominator would not align with property owners’
reasonable expectations.
4. How the Murr Dissent’s Expected Denominator Outcome Aligns with
Property Owners’ Reasonable Expectations
The Murr dissent would yield, with consistency across courts, denominator
outcomes in agreement with property owners’ reasonable expectations. In the case
of Lucas, consideration of state and local law alone instructs that, absent a merger
provision, Lots 22 and 24 should be treated as distinct parcels. Such a denominator
conforms with property owners’ reasonable expectations, as most property owners
would assume that courts perceive property in a way that is consistent with the
property’s definition under the law.
B. Case 2: Lost Tree Village Corporation
The denominator problem operated as the central issue in Lost Tree Village
Corp. v. United States (Lost Tree),164 a case involving a lengthy and complicated
procedural history.165 After the Army Corps of Engineers denied Lost Tree Village
Corporation (Lost Tree) a wetlands fill permit166 for Plat 57, Lost Tree argued a
takings under Lucas, contending that said permit denial deprived Lost Tree of all
economically viable use of the parcel.167
Plat 57—the parcel at issue—“consist[ed] of 1.41 acres of submerged lands and
3.58 acres of wetlands . . . .”168 Plat 57 was part of a property transaction made by
Lost Tree in 1974.169 The transaction was one of a series of transactions agreed to
by Lost Tree in a 1968 option agreement, in which Lost Tree consented “to purchase
approximately 2,750 acres of property.”170 “Beginning in 1969 and continuing
through the mid-1990s, Lost Tree developed approximately 1,300 acres of the
164 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
165 Six different court opinions emanate from this one dispute. See Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v.
United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 92 (2017); Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111
(Fed. Cir. 2015); Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 219 (2014); Lost Tree Vill.
Corp. v. United States (Lost Tree III), 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v.
United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 412 (2011); Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States (Lost Tree I),
92 Fed. Cl. 711 (2010).
166 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (codifying Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and which requires
the procurement of a permit “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable
waters at specified disposal sites”).
167 See Lost Tree III, 707 F.3d at 1291.
168 Id. at 1290.
169 Id. at 1288.
170 Id.
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property . . . into the upscale gated residential community of John’s Island.”171
“[D]evelopment . . . proceeded in a ‘piecemeal’ manner, by ‘opportunistic progres-
sion,’ rather than strictly following any master . . . plan.”172
Plat 57 “was absent from Lost Tree’s development plans until 2002—at least
seven years after the development . . . was considered complete.”173 By the time Lost
Tree applied for the permit in 2002, the company had sold off most of the 2,750
acres, retaining title to only Plat 57, Plat 55, and scattered wetlands within the resi-
dential community.174 It was Lost Tree’s intention to build one residential home on
Plat 57 and it “obtained all state and local approvals” to do so.175 In denying Lost
Tree’s Section 404 permit application, the Army Corps of Engineers cited the
availability of “less environmentally damaging alternatives”176 and stated that “the
project purpose has already been realized through the development of home-sites
within the subdivision.”177 Ultimately, the court was charged with deciding whether
the denominator was (1) the total of the tracts purchased under the 1968 option
agreement, (2) Plat 57 alone, or (3) something in-between.178
1. Analysis Under the Murr Majority’s Test
Analysis under factor one—treatment of the property under state and local
law—favors a single parcel denominator (i.e., Plat 57 alone). First, Plat 57 is legally
distinct from Lost Tree’s other holdings.179 While the tract was acquired as part of
the 1968 option agreement, the site was independently platted in 2002,180 long after
the residential development was complete, and well after Lost Tree sold off most of
its holdings in the area.181 Second, no merger provision combining Plat 57 to another
tract, was at play.182 For these reasons, factor one of Murr supports a denominator
comprised of Plat 57 alone.
Analysis under factor two—physical characteristics of the land—favors a
denominator larger than just Plat 57. “Plat 57 is contiguous to, and physically a part
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1289.
173 Id. at 1294. Plat 57 went ignored even when Lost Tree developed the rest of the penin-
sula on which Plat 57 was located. Id. at 1290.
174 Id. at 1294.
175 Id. at 1291.
176 Id.
177 Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States (Lost Tree I), 92 Fed. Cl. 711, 721 (2010).
178 See Lost Tree III, 707 F.3d at 1293–94.
179 See id. at 1294 (explaining that there is no legal connection between the holdings suffi-
cient to find that they constitute a single parcel).
180 Lost Tree I, 92 Fed. Cl. at 716.
181 In fact, after the mid-1990s, “Lost Tree’s business shifted to management of an invest-
ment portfolio, and Lost Tree changed its tax status to suit this new focus.” Id. at 720.
182 Id. at 721.
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of, the [residential] community of John’s Island. It can be reached by road only by first
passing through one of the gates for entry into the community.”183 Because Plat 57
cannot be accessed without traveling through some of Lost Tree’s other, former hold-
ings, a court may consider the denominator to include such other holdings. Plat 57
is further described “as ‘a mangrove swamp and wetlands . . . disturbed by scattered
upland soil mounds . . . and by manmade ditches installed for mosquito control.’”184 A
court may therefore argue that Lost Tree could have anticipated development restric-
tions on such environmentally vulnerable and valuable property. On the other hand,
Lost Tree could counter that development was permitted on nearby lots comparable to
Plat 57, and that reasonable property owners would not have predicted such a burden-
some restriction at the time of purchase.185 Ultimately, factor two supports treating
Plat 57 as part of a denominator which includes Lost Tree’s remaining holdings, and
potentially all parcels originally purchased under the 1968 option agreement.
Analysis under factor three—prospective value of the regulated land—also sup-
ports a larger denominator determination, making a takings claim more challenging
for the landowner. “Plat 57 appears to have little value in its present state, either en-
vironmentally or aesthetically. Rather than enhance the value of the lands around it . . .
Plat 57 draws value from those parcels.”186 While Plat 57’s undeveloped character
could add some value to the other tracts purchased under the 1968 option agreement,
the value added to Plat 57 by such other parcels lends itself towards the “special
relationship” described by the Murr court.187 This information favors a denominator
extending beyond Plat 57, that is, a denominator which includes Lost Tree’s remain-
ing holdings, and possibly all parcels purchased under the 1968 option agreement.
2. Analysis Under the Murr Dissent’s Test
Again, analysis under the dissent’s test would yield the same denominator furnished
under factor one of the majority’s test. Thus, Plat 57 alone, a legally distinct parcel,
would constitute the denominator. Lost Tree’s remaining holdings and any other
tracts purchased under the 1968 option agreement would not be included.
3. How the Murr Majority’s Expected Denominator Outcome Aligns with
Property Owners’ Reasonable Expectations
Reasonable property owners, when applying for a Section 404 wetlands fill
permit for a specific parcel, would believe that the regulating party—in this case the
183 Id.
184 Id. at 716.
185 Id. at 715–16.
186 Id. at 721.
187 See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1946 (2017) (suggesting that a “special relation-
ship” between commonly owned parcels may counsel the court to favor combining said parcels
for the purpose of the denominator).
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Army Corps of Engineers—would only consider that parcel referenced on the permit
application. Under the Murr majority, however, it is possible that the Lost Tree
denominator would not be limited to Plat 57. Instead, the denominator is likely to
include at least some of Lost Tree’s remaining holdings, and or other former hold-
ings acquired under the 1968 option agreement.188
As expected, factor one (treatment of the property under state and local law)
commands that the legally distinct Plat 57 alone constitute the denominator. How-
ever, under factor two (physical characteristics of the property), a judge might
increase the size of the denominator for two reasons. First, with respect to physical
location, Plat 57 can only be accessed through some of Lost Tree’s other, former
holdings.189 Second, a court may argue that reasonable property owners could an-
ticipate development restrictions on irreplaceable wetlands property. A judge may
also increase the size of the denominator under factor three (prospective value of the
regulated land), as Plat 57 arguably shares a “special relationship”190 with Lost
Tree’s other holdings. Even the United States Court of Federal Claims admitted that
“[r]ather than enhance the value of the lands around it . . . Plat 57 draws value from
those [other] parcels.”191 Nonetheless, any denominator beyond the parcel explicitly
mentioned on Lost Tree’s Section 404 application is obviously at odds with property
owners’ reasonable expectations. The potential inclusion of Lost Tree’s former
holdings, moreover, seems especially unfair. Finally, these denominator-increasing
arguments will be counted against the plaintiffs at both stages of the takings inquiry,
thus diminishing plaintiffs’ chances for a successful takings claim.
4. How the Murr Dissent’s Expected Denominator Outcome Aligns with
Property Owners’ Reasonable Expectations
Under the facts of Lost Tree Village, the Murr dissent’s test would again produce
a denominator outcome in agreement with property owners’ reasonable expecta-
tions. Because no merger provision is at play, state and local law dictates that the
denominator only include Plat 57. Such a state-based denominator definition is both
intuitive and not amenable to the varying discretion of judges.
C. Case 3: Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,192
a Lucas taking was asserted where two moratoria effectively halted “all development
188 See infra Section IV.A (discussing how a judge applying the Murr factors might increase
the size of the denominator).
189 Lost Tree I, 92 Fed. Ct. at 721.
190 See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946 (suggesting that if the relationship between a landowner’s
properties is such that they increase each other’s value, the relationship supports including
both properties in the denominator).
191 Lost Tree I, 92 Fed. Cl. at 721.
192 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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[on plaintiffs’ properties] . . . for a period of 32 months.”193 The moratoria were
implemented by the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to provide TRPA
with time to study the impact of local development on Lake Tahoe and to devise a
comprehensive environmental strategy to protect the lake upon future development.194
Plaintiffs included the Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, a nonprofit organization
“representing about 2,000 owners of both improved and unimproved parcels . . . in
the Lake Tahoe Basin,” and “some 400 individual owners of vacant lots” who had
“purchased their properties prior to the effective date of the 1980 [Tahoe Regional
Planning] Compact,”195 which created TRPA and “set goals for the protection and
preservation of the lake.”196 As for the reasonable expectations of the vacant lot
owners, most of the properties were purchased “for the purpose of constructing ‘at
a time of their choosing’ a single-family home ‘to serve as a permanent, retirement
or vacation residence.’”197
Tahoe is different from the previous two cases (Lucas and Lost Tree) in that the
Tahoe Court did not have to decide whether a property owner’s other holdings
should be included when defining the denominator.198 After enumerating the three
factors for use during the denominator inquiry, the Murr majority stated: “The en-
deavor should determine whether reasonable expectations about property ownership
would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel,
or, instead, as separate tracts.”199 Despite this statement, it is not clear whether the
factors only aim to assist denominator determinations in cases where additional
holdings can be considered, or if the Murr factors can also influence the denomina-
tor when only one holding is at issue. Nevertheless, even if the Court intended that
the factors only be used when other holdings could be considered relevant, it is easy
to imagine a court informally, perhaps subconsciously, adjusting the denominator
by virtue of the factors where only one holding is at play. The analysis below
illustrates how denominators might be manipulated even where only a single-parcel
holding is involved.200
193 Id. at 306.
194 See id. The Court further explained: “the lake’s pristine state has deteriorated rapidly over
the past 40 years; increased land development in the Lake Tahoe Basin . . . has threatened
the ‘noble sheet of blue water’ beloved by Twain and countless others.” Id. at 307.
195 Id. at 312.
196 Id. at 309.
197 Id. at 312–13.
198 See id. at 312 (explaining the Tahoe Court dealt with many property owners, each of
whom had only one holding).
199 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017).
200 It is worth noting that some of the Tahoe plaintiffs may have possessed more than one
regulated parcel; however, because of the limited issue considered by the Court—“whether
a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-
use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings
Clause”—the opinion mainly addresses whether the denominator may be segmented in
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1. Analysis Under the Murr Majority’s Test
Analysis under factor one—treatment of the property under state and local law—
would approach each parcel as individual fee simple interests. A significant feature
of Tahoe was the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempt to “conceptually sever” their parcel
definition into “temporal segments.”201 In different words, plaintiffs framed their de-
nominator as a thirty-two-month slice of their fee simple estate. The Court responded
by stating that “defining the property interest taken in terms of the very regulation
being challenged [(the aggregate thirty-two-month moratoria)] is circular.”202 In agree-
ment with Tahoe and other precedent dating back to Penn Central, Murr commands
treatment of the parcel as a whole, and appears to address this issue of conceptual
severance under factor one.203 Accordingly, the length of the moratoria will have no
impact on the size of the denominator. Instead, the parcels are to be looked at through
a lens of permanence, and the duration of moratoria is to be considered at the second
stage of the takings analysis. As discussed supra,204 factor one directs courts to con-
sider whether the pertinent regulation was in place at the time the owners acquired the
property. With respect to the moratoria, the Compact establishing TRPA, the organiza-
tion responsible for implementing the moratoria, was not in effect at the time the va-
cant lot owners purchased their properties.205 Such a fact bolsters the argument that
the moratoria were not foreseeable or in agreement with the property owners’ reason-
able expectations. In theory, this might support a smaller denominator determination
in favor of the plaintiffs. In practice, however, it is hard to imagine a court formu-
laically reducing the size of the denominator for this reason.206
Analysis under factor two—physical characteristics of the land—is likely to favor
a larger denominator, thus reducing plaintiffs’ chances for a successful takings claim.
The Tahoe opinion states: “All agree that Lake Tahoe is ‘uniquely beautiful,’ . . .
that President Clinton was right to call it a “‘national treasure that must be protected
accordance with the length of the pertinent regulation, and not whether any of the plaintiffs’
parcels should be combined when calculating their respective denominators. Tahoe-Sierra,
535 U.S. at 306.
201 See id. at 318.
202 Id. at 331. The Court elaborated: “Petitioners’ ‘conceptual severance’ argument is un-
availing because it ignores Penn Central’s admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must
focus on ‘the parcel as a whole.’ We have consistently rejected such an approach to the ‘denomi-
nator’ question.” Id. (citations omitted).
203 Murr instructs: “State law defines all of the interests that come along with owning a
particular parcel,” and the “risk of strategic unbundling is not present when a legally distinct par-
cel is the basis of the regulatory takings claim.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1953 (emphasis added).
204 See supra text accompanying notes 96–98.
205 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312.
206 In agreement with my proposition that the dissent’s state law–based test is better suited
for calculating the denominator, I believe that the regulation’s foreseeability should only be
considered at the second stage of the takings analysis, under the Penn Central balancing test.
See supra text accompanying notes 28–30, 44–52.
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and preserved,”’ and that Mark Twain aptly described the clarity of its waters as ‘not
merely transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so.’”207 A Tahoe footnote further
acknowledges a senate report declaring that “[o]nly two other sizable lakes in the
world are of comparable quality. . . .”208 While the Compact establishing TRPA, the
organization charged with regulating development in Lake Tahoe Basin,209 was not
in operation when the vacant lot owners purchased their properties, a court may
argue that given the generally recognized importance and exceptional quality of the
area’s natural resources, affected property owners could have anticipated future
restrictions on development in effecting conservation efforts. On the other hand, an
argument can be made that reasonable property owners would not consider how
development of their land might affect local runoff, and, in turn, negatively impact
the waters of a local lake.
Analysis under factor three—prospective value of the regulated land—is also
likely to support a larger denominator. As discussed supra,210 the Murr majority
directs courts to consider whether the regulation’s impact can be mitigated by the
value it adds “to the remaining [unregulated] property.”211 Even if the moratoria
halted development on every square inch of each plaintiff’s tract for the aggregate
thirty-two-month duration, a court will argue that the moratoria still added value to
the “remaining property.”212 Because property should be considered over time (as a
temporal estate), it can be argued that without such a moratoria, continued, uncon-
trolled development would have likely destroyed the quality of Lake Tahoe’s water,
and in turn, local property values would have plummeted, as a great portion of the
lots’ values are rooted in their proximity to the pristine lake. Accordingly, given that
one of the moratoria’s objectives was, arguably, to preserve the market values of the
lands being regulated, a court is likely to view the moratoria as a value-preserving
or value-enhancing regulation, which will likely support a larger denominator more
favorable to the regulator: the government.
2. Analysis Under the Murr Dissent’s Test
Analysis under the dissent’s test would produce the same denominator as that
supplied under factor one of the majority’s test. Each parcel would be treated as a
fee simple interest, as dictated by lot lines and any existing regulations. The parcel
would also be viewed as a continuing estate over time, not as a thirty-two-month
segment in isolation.
207 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307 (citations omitted).
208 Id. at 307 n.2.
209 See id. at 309.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 103–07.
211 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1946 (2017).
212 Id.
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3. How the Murr Majority’s Expected Denominator Outcome Aligns with
Property Owners’ Reasonable Expectations
It is very possible that analysis under the Murr majority could yield different
denominators—from those actually observed in Tahoe—for each of the respective
plaintiffs. As discussed in Section III.C,213 it is unclear if the Murr factors are only
to be applied in cases where an owner’s additional holdings can be considered. As-
suming that the Murr factors can also influence a court’s treatment of one parcel, the
second and third Murr factors could skew denominator outcomes, cutting against
property owners’ reasonable expectations. Consistent with my proposition that the
dissent’s test—factor one under the Murr majority—yields denominators in better
agreement with property owners’ reasonable expectations, factor one, as applied to
Tahoe, does just that. Here, factor one instructs that each parcel be treated as fee
simple interests through a lens of permanence214 and in accord with existing regula-
tions. Under factor two (physical characteristics of the land), however, a judge may
expand the size of the denominator, making a takings claim more difficult for the
plaintiff, given the fact that reasonable property owners might anticipate future de-
velopment restrictions in light of conservation concerns regarding the revered local
lake. Moreover, under factor three (prospective value of the regulated land), a judge
may again expand the size of the denominator in her belief that the moratoria adds
future value to the pertinent estate, through its overall objective of preserving Lake
Tahoe’s pristine quality, and in consequence, its preserving the estate’s high market
value. Having said this, even if the decided denominator is never articulated by the
court, the double-counting of these arguments—once when defining the denominator,
and again when conducting the Penn Central balancing test to determine whether a
taking has occurred—in favor of the government, and to the detriment of the plain-
tiff, is patently at odds with property owners’ reasonable expectations.
4. How the Murr Dissent’s Expected Denominator Outcome Aligns with
Property Owners’ Reasonable Expectations
The Murr dissent’s test, as applied to Tahoe, produces denominator outcomes
in agreement with property owners’ reasonable expectations. Consideration of state
213 See discussion supra Section III.C (“[I]t is not clear whether the factors only aim to
assist denominator determinations in cases where additional holdings can be considered, or
if the Murr factors can also influence the denominator when only one holding is at issue.”).
214 That is, without any time constraints, and more specifically, beyond the thirty-two-month
duration during which the moratoria were in effect. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1953 (Roberts,
C.J. dissenting); Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331. Because factor one instructs that state law
defines the boundaries of parcels, and because state law in Tahoe defined the owners’ property
as fee simple estates, the Court must treat each property as a fee simple rather than severing
the properties into temporary, smaller parcels.
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and local law alone instructs that, absent a merger provision, each plaintiff’s parcel
be treated as “permanent” fee simple interests in accord with existing (lawful)
regulations. Unlike in the majority’s test, the denominator inquiry stops, more or
less, at the lot lines; it does not lend itself to the arbitrary increase of denominator
size at the discretion of judges.
IV. WHY THE MURR DISSENT’S TEST IS THE SUPERIOR SOLUTION
TO THE “DENOMINATOR PROBLEM”
A. Theoretical Problems with the Majority’s Test
On a basic level, a multifactor balancing test appears completely at odds with
what reasonable property owners expect at the first stage of the takings inquiry—
when courts are merely tasked with defining the property at issue. Instead, reason-
able property owners would anticipate a bright-line solution to such a seemingly
simple task,215 especially if they were to appreciate how robust the Court’s discretion
is under the latter part of the takings inquiry.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts writes: “[T]he Takings Clause protects indi-
viduals from being forced to bear the full weight of actions that should be borne by
the public at large. The majority’s new, malleable definition of ‘private property’ . . .
undermines that protection.”216 As per Chief Justice Roberts’s suggestion, a slippery
slope argument can be made. Under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
the law.”217 By granting courts the power to manipulate the definition of property
beyond that designated under state law, the protection under which the law is sup-
posed to afford property vanishes.218 In other words, how can property interests be
215 In my view, most reasonable property owners would think that a court’s definition of a
given parcel would match that delineated in the property’s deed, subject to any governmental
regulations that may be in place. That said, I believe that most reasonable property owners
would be displeased with the amount of discretion that courts have in defining parcels for the
purpose of takings challenges.
216 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See also JUERGENSMEYER &
ROBERTS, supra note 21, at 387 (“The absence of consistent standards has made the consti-
tutional protection of property susceptible to change, as different social and judicial outlooks
have gained power over time.”).
217 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
218 Indeed, philosopher John Locke would likely be perturbed by the Court’s manipulable
denominator test. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 162 (1988)
(“[Locke] argues that property-owning got under way at a time when there was no government,
and that the function or ‘end’ of government is to protect property holdings that it has not
itself constituted.”); see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings
Clause, 72 MO. L. REV. 525, 532–33 (2007) (“In Locke’s view, Civil Society was a con-
sensual union formed by individuals who sought protection for their personal and property
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protected by the law when such interests are simultaneously subject to judicial
engineering and interpretation?
Given that our legal framework, at its most basic level, is meant to preserve life,
liberty and property,219 the majority’s solution should raise some alarm.220 In my
opinion, if a group of “reasonable property owners” were surveyed, such individuals
would likely find malleable definitions of property—different from those stipulated
under law—to be disagreeable and susceptible to exploitation contrary to their
interests. To be clear, reasonable property owners who want to maintain control of
their property are unlikely to prefer the Murr majority’s test.
On a deeper level, given property’s associations with autonomy and fundamen-
tal liberties,221 landowners should be able to anticipate how their property will be
understood by courts. A denominator definition at odds with reasonable property
owners’ expectations can be injurious in itself—harmful to individuals’ dignity inter-
ests. If the court defines the parcel in such a way that the landowner feels she has
received unfair treatment, this designation can feel like a personal affront. Beyond its
importance in the takings inquiry (as mentioned earlier, the denominator definition
is generally thought to be outcome-determinative, and the prospect of just compensa-
tion is on the line) people attach great sentimental value to their land.222 Land is a sym-
bol of freedom and potential; one’s land may encapsulate certain memories, may
represent the labor exerted by its proprietor to attain its ownership, and may embody
ideas and possibilities for the owner’s vision of the future.223 Further, land is supposed
rights from the uncertainty that existed in the State of Nature. Indeed, securing those private
property rights acquired through labor in the State of Nature was a chief purpose of the formation
of government in Civil Society.”).
219 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
220 One may ask: is our property really being protected when it is subject to such unpre-
dictable treatment by courts?
221 See David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions of Property
in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 472 (1993) (“[Philosopher John
Locke argued that] [p]roperty is a natural and pre-political institution given to man by God,
and a property interest gives the owner a singular and absolute control over something which
no one, including the state, could violate.”); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 256 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1990) (1840) (“In no country in the
world is the love of property more active and more anxious than in the United States; nowhere
does the majority display less inclination for those principles which threaten to alter, in what-
ever manner, the laws of property.”).
222 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 568 (2005) (“In cases of sentimental attachment, the owner finds in the asset emo-
tional utility not accessible to other market participants and, therefore, not reflected in the market
price. In other words, the price at which the owner will agree to sell the asset (the reserve price)
will exceed the price that ordinary market participants will pay (the market price).”).
223 See Josh Blackman, OutFoxed: Pierson v. Post and the Natural Law, 51 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 417, 434 (2011) (describing John Locke’s “Labor Theory”) (“The crux of Locke’s theory
of property is based on man acquiring property through his efforts, skills, and labor.”).
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to be within its proprietor’s control.224 It therefore seems especially unjust to allow
courts to tell landowners that their property is not what they think it is—that their
land should instead be measured at sizes different than that prescribed under state
law for reasons such as unusually steep terrain,225 or because of pre-existing regula-
tory encumbrances.226 In such instances, landowners can be left feeling misunder-
stood and as though the government is personally out to get them.
The flexibility in the majority’s denominator analysis seems to unilaterally
benefit the government during the takings inquiry. It is hard to think of an instance
where the majority’s test actually reduces the parcel’s size, thus improving the
plaintiff’s prospects at a successful takings claim. Instead, as compared with a de-
nominator strictly defined by state law boundaries, as per the dissent’s recommenda-
tion, the only possible impact of the majority’s flexible denominator analysis is to
increase the parcel’s size, if any change is made compared to the state-determined
definition of the parcel. This makes takings claims all the more difficult for plaintiffs
and all the easier for local governments.
Despite the majority’s attempt to achieve supposed fairness with use of its
balancing test, it is hard to conceive of any harms resulting from the dissent’s simple
state law based denominator solution. Only reasonable denominator outcomes would
follow, and no surprises would ensue. The majority’s balancing test, however, seems
to create more problems than it fixes: the test appears to only work in the govern-
ment’s favor and always to the detriment of property owner plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs can make another slippery slope argument. At the end of the day, people
do not want to buy or develop real property if they feel that the government can un-
predictably manipulate their property rights and thus restrict what they can do with
their property.227 People also fear litigation,228 which is sure to increase as a result of
the majority’s proposed denominator solution.
B. Practical Problems with Majority’s Test
“The flexibility the balancing test provides . . . strips governments and litigants
of any certainty regarding how the court will characterize a property for the takings
224 See Katrina M. Wyman, In Defense of the Fee Simple, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6
(2017) (“The bundle that any owner enjoys, whether they own in fee simple or not, typically in-
cludes the right to exclude others from the land, the right to possess it, the right to use and enjoy
it, the right to sell the interest, the right to devise it, and the right to pass it by inheritance.”).
225 See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1946, 1948 (2017).
226 See id. at 1945.
227 In my opinion, people generally want clear rules so that they can plan for the future.
A bright-line solution, like that provided in the Murr dissent, offers more predictability as to
how a court may come out in the event that a property owner finds herself in circumstances
appropriate for a takings claim.
228 In my view, most reasonable individuals would prefer to avoid litigation, given the
costs and headaches likely to stem from it.
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analysis.”229 In consequence, the only parties who appear to benefit from the major-
ity’s overly complicated ad hoc denominator test are property attorneys. With
minimal guidance, future regulatory takings plaintiffs are left with little understand-
ing as to their prospects for success. In even the most meritorious takings cases,
property owners will have to spend considerable sums of money paying for attorneys
who, despite their diligent efforts, may still offer little insight into how courts will de-
fine the pertinent parcel. Such attorneys will have to engage in lengthy fact-finding
investigations in their attempts to anticipate every nuance that the court may con-
sider. Attorneys will also rack up considerable billing hours when researching courts’
treatment of the denominator question under this new, multifactor test. Granted, with
such sweeping judicial discretion, denominator outcomes could vary dramatically
depending on the judge and jurisdiction. At the same time, some of these research
costs could prove futile, as “[t]he multi-factored balancing approach . . . makes each
case a rule unto itself,”230 and the court’s allocation of weight to each factor may be
ignored or poorly explained in judicial opinions. Further, to those plaintiffs who
cannot afford these added costs, tough luck!
The majority test’s allowance of added discretion at the parcel definition stage
will be of considerable expense to courts. Because of the additional fact-finding and
balancing required under the multifactor test, more litigation as well as prolonged
litigation is likely to follow. Accordingly, additional time and resources will be ex-
pended to accommodate this less-than-straightforward test.
Woffinden highlights yet another weakness of the majority’s test: “The test also
has the added danger of giving so much leeway to judges that the balancing test
actually hides discriminatory or biased decision making.”231 This susceptibility to
discriminatory decision-making—which already existed in the latter part of the
takings inquiry—would not exist under the dissent’s proposed denominator solution.
This risk is worthy of attention and provides yet another example of how the
potential harms stemming from the majority test seem to unilaterally fall on future
regulatory takings plaintiffs. Again, it is hard to imagine a way in which the major-
ity’s solution could possibly hurt the government’s standing during a takings claim.
Although it is difficult to see much benefit from the majority’s solution,
Woffinden speculates about a potential silver lining: “It is possible that neither the
government nor property owners will have an incentive to engage in opportunistic
or wasteful behavior because neither party knows how a court will actually apply
the multi-factored balancing test to a particular landowner.”232
229 Keith Woffinden, The Parcel as a Whole: A Presumptive Structural Approach for Deter-
mining When the Government Has Gone Too Far, 2008 BYU L. REV. 623, 645–46.
230 Id. at 653.
231 Id. at 644.
232 Id. at 645.
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CONCLUSION
The Murr dissent offers the superior solution to the denominator problem in real
property regulatory takings cases. Unlike the Murr majority’s test, the Murr dis-
sent’s test yields predictable denominator outcomes—i.e., predictable definitions of
property—in agreement with property owners’ reasonable expectations. Naturally,
most property owners, reasonably, expect their property to be defined by and
protected by our nation’s legal framework. Under the majority’s test, however, such
presumed protections are undermined, as the test allows courts the ability to judi-
cially engineer property definitions for the purpose of takings claims.233 Put differ-
ently, it is fundamentally inconsistent to believe that our laws can adequately protect
our property when our courts have the discretion to define said property as they
choose, in accordance with the majority’s ill-defined multifactor balancing test.
Moreover, the majority’s balancing test, despite its guise of fairness, unilaterally
harms property owners by permitting the government to double-count facts that
were previously accounted for only during the second stage of the takings inquiry.
Ultimately, a bright-line denominator test—consistent with state law principles—
would be less burdensome on courts, allowing for consistent, predictable application,
and increased clarity to future plaintiffs as to their prospects in takings claims.
Having said this, the Murr dissent proposes a better denominator solution with
respect to meeting reasonable property owner expectations. The simpler solution is
the superior solution.
233 See supra Section II.B.1(a)–(c) (providing the Murr majority test).
